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Introduction
The first European elections in the Union of 25 were held
on 10-13 June 2004. As a result, the European Parliament
has become the world’s largest democratically-elected
parliamentary chamber, having grown from 198 members
before the first direct elections in 1979 to the present
total of 732, bringing together representatives of over
100 different political parties from across a continent.
The following week, on 18 June, the 25 governments
agreed on a new Constitution for Europe. Assuming the
Constitution is ratified, the EP’s legislative and
budgetary powers will be further reinforced, with, in
particular, ‘codecision’, by which Parliament and
Council must agree on laws on the basis of a Commission
proposal, being further extended and becoming the
‘ordinary legislative procedure’ for European laws
affecting some half a billion people.
Little more one month later, the Parliament’s powers
regarding appointments began to be demonstrated. On
22 July, the European Parliament exercised its right to
approve the person nominated by Council as next
Commission President, José Manuel Barroso. In
September and October it held hearings for the proposed
members of the Commission. Indeed, this role received
a very high degree of public attention. In the face of
widespread opposition within the Parliament, in
particular to the candidate proposed as Commissioner
for Justice, Freedom and Security – the Italian nominee,
Rocco Buttiglione – Mr Barroso did not at first alter the
composition of the proposed College. In the end,
however, he decided to ask for a postponement of the
Parliament’s planned vote of approval on 27 October.
The new Commission could thus not take office on 1
November.
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In this context, the question naturally arises as to the
possible impacts of enlargement on the European Parlia-
ment at this time of mounting political responsibilities.
This paper discusses three aspects of this question,
looking at the position of the Parliament as of October
2004: the possible impact on Parliament’s efficiency, in
terms of its internal structures and working methods; on
its coherence, in the sense of its Groups’ ability, together
with European political parties, to be seen to present
clear policy choices at European level; and on its
legitimacy, in terms of its public support.
1. Efficiency
The first set of questions concern the possible impact of
enlargement on the practical work of the Parliament.
Impacts on size and structures
The most obvious direct effect of enlargement has been
the increase in the EP’s numbers from 626 to 732. This
has had the important consequence of reducing the size
of the national delegations from 13 of the 15 ‘old’Member
States, with only the largest (Germany at 99) and smallest
(Luxembourg at 6) remaining at their pre-2004 figure.
For the larger Member States the difference may not
seem so great, but for some of the smaller Member States
the impact has been of more obvious significance. Irish
governments, for example, have tended to put greater
emphasis on their representation in the Commission and
in the Council because they considered that they had
more weight there than within the European Parliament.
Another such impact has been the great increase in
the number of political parties represented in the
Parliament. After the 2004 elections there were 114
parties and lists from the old Member States (although
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20 of these from Italy alone), but there were 49 parties
and lists from the new Member States, a very high figure
considering the small population of most of these
countries, but reflecting their often fluid political
systems.
A further important consequence has been on voting
thresholds. Most importantly the absolute majority
required for certain types of votes, such as rejection or
amendment of EU codecision legislation in second
reading, has gone up from 314 to 367.
Another significant change is that the size of
Parliament-Council conciliation delegations has gone
up from 30 to 50, with 25
on either side rather than
15 as before enlargement.
It is too early to tell what
this will mean for the
practical management of
conciliation, but this will
probably lead to an even
greater reliance on infor-
mal meetings and ‘trialo-
gues’ between small numbers of representatives from
each institution.
A less direct impact has been the increase in the
number of committees. It was agreed already in January
2004 to increase the number of standing committees
from 17 to 20. The average size has thus been held at 43
(42, including the sub-committees), almost exactly the
same as the figure of 42.3 in 2002-2004. Moreover, new
openings have been created for chairmen and other
office-holders from the new Member States.
Impacts on turnover of the MEPs
Turnover among MEPs has been very high in recent
elections, with well under 50% of outgoing members
being re-elected in both 1994 and 1999. Enlargement
has necessarily meant that the overall proportion of new
MEPs has, at almost 60%, been even higher than usual.
A striking figure is that under 50 of the 162 members
from the new Member States had previously been among
the Observers from those countries who had been deputed
by their national parliaments to follow the work of the
EP in the months before formal enlargement. There is
clearly thus a higher number than usual of newly-
elected members for whom EU business is new in general.
Inasmuch as new members naturally require time to
settle in, this will undoubtedly have some impact in the
short term, with those of long experience of the Parliament
and its procedures coming disproportionately from just
a few countries, notably Germany and the United
Kingdom.
Impacts on working methods
Enlargement is clearly having a significant impact on
the working methods of all the EU institutions, but the
exact nature of these impacts will vary. In some respects
there may well be fewer impacts on the Parliament.
While in the Council, the traditional ‘tour de table’ has
come under new pressure, the impact on speaking patterns
within the EP is less great. In plenary, speaking time is
generally pre-planned and in committee normally
follows a more spontaneous ‘catch the eye system’, so
that not everyone tries to speak. Whereas some of the
new members have been quick to take the floor (‘is it
surprising, when we were silenced for 50 years?’ was the
explanation given to a co-author by one MEP from a new
Member State), debates do not appear to be becoming
significantly longer.
On the other hand, the day-to-day impacts of the new
languages are greater than for any of the other institu-
tions. There are a number of reasons why this should be
so. Unlike the Commission
and the working groups of
the Council, where career
civil servants usually work
in a restricted number of
languages, the European
Parliament consists of elec-
ted politicians for whom
the ability to speak foreign
languages, while highly
useful, cannot be a prerequisite for their election.
Moreover, if they are to work on and amend legislative
texts, they must have the right to do so in their native
language. Finally, maintenance of a Member State’s
identity and culture is heavily dependent on its language
and the European Parliament, with its representational
role, cannot compromise too far on this point. In any
conflict between ‘efficiency’ and ‘democracy’ there are
thus compelling arguments for the latter to prevail
within the European Parliament.
The problems associated with this, however, are
becoming more acute. The number of working languages
has gone up from 11 to 20 and the number of potential
language combinations from 110 to 380. As far as
interpretation is concerned, a number of pragmatic
solutions are being tried, such as use of pivot languages
(particularly English, but also others such as French or
German), and the placing of interpreters from lesser-
used languages in the major language booths (thus
breaking the old rule that interpreters should essentially
interpret into their own language). For the first time
many interpreters do not always know even which
language is being spoken. There are a number of major
disadvantages to all this, with greater constraints on the
holding of meetings, with some languages not being
available at such meetings, and with quality sometimes
suffering.
The problems are perhaps even more serious as
regards translation. The backlog of untranslated texts
has become much greater (even such key legislative
proposals as the REACH proposal on chemicals have
not yet been translated in the new EU languages); the
gap between the adoption of Council common positions
on legislation and their transmission as fully translated
common positions to the Parliament has gone up to an
estimated average of around six months; and the time
required for having Parliament texts (draft reports,
amendments, etc) translated is being extended, with
 In any conflict between ‘efficiency’
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further knock-on effects on Parliament’s working
timetable. The gap between committee adoption and
plenary adoption of texts is becoming longer, and there
are greater delays in the production of routine texts, such
as committee minutes, in all languages.
The EP has been exploring a variety of ways to
mitigate these problems. Interpretation is restricted for
certain meetings, with attempts being made to have a
better match of supply and demand. Thus, for example,
if a language like Estonian is not being used routinely
in a committee it will not be provided, even if an
Estonian member subsequently decides to attend a
particular meeting. Such measures, summed up by the
phrase ‘controlled multilingualism’, can help to some
extent, but major problems are likely to remain, and
even to be accentuated in the future, as further new
languages (Romanian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Turkish,
etc) are introduced and as pressure grows for certain
regional languages, such as Catalan, to be used as well.
Implications of further EU enlargements
The 2004 enlargement has been by far the largest ever
faced by the Union. Nevertheless the EU is being given
little, if any, respite, with the enlargement process
continuing. The consequences for the Parliament are
most obvious in the cases of Bulgaria and Romania. The
negotiations with them will continue to be closely
monitored by the Parliament. In a short period they may
start sending Observers from their national parliaments,
and within the term of office of the present Parliament
(the current target date is 2007) it is planned that they
should join the EU, 53 new MEPs bringing in (35 from
Romania and 18 from Bul-
garia), along with two more
languages. The overall size
of the Parliament would go
up to 785 until the next EP
elections in 2009. After
2009 the EP would again
be downsized to 736, with
all but six countries having
yet again to reduce the size
of their national delega-
tions. If the Constitution
will have entered into force
by then, however, there will
be a new total figure of 750
members, with a maximum
of 96 for the biggest coun-
tries and a minimum of six.
Successful negotiations with Croatia would again
alter these calculations. In the longer time the biggest
impacts, however, would come as a result of Turkish
accession. Quite apart from all other considerations, the
impacts on EP structure would be vast, with Turkey
likely to be entitled to more MEPs than any other
country but Germany. If the remaining Balkan countries,
Ukraine and others also came in, the EP would be faced
even more starkly with the invidious choice of becoming
an even larger Parliament, or else of sharply cutting back
the size of most national delegations, with many of the
smaller countries, in particular, running the risk of
feeling insufficiently represented within the Parliament.
To sum up, the 2004 enlargement, as far as numbers are
concerned, should not have a strong adverse effect on
the Parliament’s basic functioning. The basic structures
have been adapted to the new numbers. In the short term,
one may expect a certain slowing-down of business as
the large numbers of new MEPs, especially those who
are also from new Member States, settle in. The main
question is whether the increase in languages can be
managed without causing excessive delays, especially
after further enlargement.
2. Political Balance and Political Coherence
The second set of questions concerns the political
coherence of the European Parliament, understood here
as both the cohesion of the Political Groups in their
voting behaviour and the degree to which their positions
are seen as offering distinct policy options at European
level. It is too early to judge what impact this enlargement
will have – and this is a complex subject which goes
beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, some
preliminary observations are possible.
Impact on the political balance within the EP
Table 1 shows the political balance in the European
Parliament as it was in the 1999-2004 term2 and as it was
agreed on 20 July following the 2004 elections.
The share of the two largest groups in the end
remained more or less the
same. In fact it actually
decreased slightly from
65.2% of the old Parlia-
ment to 63.9% today, in
spite of some prior predic-
tions that it could increase
significantly and as seemed
to be indicated by the fact
that so many of the obser-
vers from the new Member
States joined the two largest
groups. In the event, some
of these parties, notably the
Socialists in Poland, did
badly in the June 2004
elections, and this was
reflected in the final result.
Moreover, both groups had been represented in all
Member States. The EPP have maintained this status,
with 69 MEPs from all ten new Member States. This is,
however, no longer the case for the Socialists, who only
have 31 MEPs from just eight of the new Member States
and no members at all from Cyprus or Latvia.
The largest increase in membership has been in the
Liberal Group, whose share of the total has risen from
8.5% to 12%. Most of this increase is due to having made
new recruits from outside the traditional liberal parties
The 2004 enlargement, as far as
numbers are concerned, should not
have a strong adverse effect on the
Parliament’s basic functioning.
The main question is whether
the increase in languages can
be managed without causing
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in the old Member States (notably in France and in Italy),
and this has been reflected in the slight change in the
Group’s name. However it also has nineteen members
from eight of the ten new Member States (the exceptions
being in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia), with the
Group doing particularly well in Lithuania, where it has
seven seats and over half of all Lithuanian MEPs.
Predictions that the Green/EFA Group would fare
badly as a result of enlargement have been confirmed,
with only one (EFA rather than Green) member from
Latvia, and with no representative in any of the other
new Member States. The Green/EFA Group, however,
has just managed to become the fourth largest group in
the Parliament, in considerable measure because of its
good result in Germany.
The GUE/NGL Group has gone from fourth to fifth
in size, and is also unrepresented in seven of the ten new
Member States, the exceptions being Cyprus, Estonia
and the Czech Republic.
Finally, enlargement has made a significant contri-
bution to the two smallest groups in the Parliament. The
former Europe of Democracies and Diversities (EDD)
Group has been renamed as the Independence and
Democracy Group (IND/DEM). Essentially consisting
of Eurosceptics it has grown from 2.9% to 4.4%, with its
two largest delegations being the eleven members from
the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), and
the ten members from the League of Polish Families. The
biggest proportionate impact of enlargement, however,
has been on Parliament’s smallest Group, the UEN,
whose Italian and Irish core have been bolstered by
recruits from several of the new Member States, including
seven Poles, four Latvians (the single largest group of
Latvian MEPs) and two Lithuanians. These 13 members
thus make up almost half the total membership of the
Group. It is simply too early, however, to tell what kind
of impact the changed composition of these latter groups
may have on the work of Parliament.
Besides these comments on the changed internal
balance within the EP political groups a few words
Table 1: The Evolution of the Political Balance in the European Parliament
1999-2004 2004-2009
Political Group Seats % total Seats % total
Christian Democrats/ EPP-ED 232 37.1 268 36.6
Conservatives
Socialists PES 176 28.1 200 27.3
Liberals ALDE ELDR 53 8.5 ALDE 88 12.0
Greens plus Greens/EFA 44 7.0 42 5.7
Left GUE/NGL 49 7.8 41 5.6
‘Sceptics’5 IND/DEM EDD 18 2.9 IND/DEM 32 4.4
Other UEN6 23 3.7 27 3.7
Other NI 31 5.0 34 4.6
Total 626 732
EPP-ED Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats
PES Socialist Group in the European Parliament
ALDE Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
ELDR Group of the European Liberal, Democratic and Reform Party
Greens/EFA Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance
GUE/NGL Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left
IND/DEM Independence and Democracy Group
EDD Europe of Democracies and Diversities Group
UEN Union for Europe of the Nations Group
NI Non-attached Members
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should be added about the overall political balance
among the groups. The most striking feature is that the
two largest groups, in spite of the slight drop in their
overall share that was noted above, again entered into
an agreement to divide up the Parliament Presidency
between themselves over the 2004-2009 term of office.
This had become standard practice before 1999, but in
the 1999-2004 Parliament the ‘grand coalition’ had
broken down, and been replaced by a deal over the
Presidency between the EPP and Liberal Groups.
A second important element is that the Liberal
Group, while much smaller than the two largest groups,
is now much bigger than the other groups. More than
ever it is in a key position as an arbiter of many swing
votes within the Parliament.
Finally there has been some speculation over the
impact of the success of Eurosceptic parties in a number
of EU countries, notably UKIP in the United Kingdom.
In practice their success was an uneven one and in
Denmark, for example, they lost support. The overall
impact on the European Parliament political balance
was thus limited. The IND/DEM Group has certainly
gained considerably in size, but the consequences of
this on the workings of the Parliament are not yet
evident.
Impacts on political coherence
It also remains to be seen what enlargement may mean
for the further evolution of the political groups – and of
European political parties – in providing clear options
for European politics.
There has been a fairly high degree of cohesion, at
least among the largest groups. Looking at voting
records from 1979 to 2001, Hix, Kreppel and Noury
conclude that the Socialists, EPP and Liberals acted as
‘relatively cohesive party organizations’ with average
scores on an agreement index of 0.84 in the first term to
0.89 in the fifth. This may be lower than in European
domestic parliaments where the executive relies on a
majority in parliament, but is higher than in the United
States, where there is a separation of powers. Moreover,
the general trend has been upwards.3
Yet there are still many issues on which MEPs will
vote in a particular way corresponding to national,
regional or sectoral interest rather than political group
affiliation There are also considerable divergences within
most political groups regarding the depth and direction
of European integration, and often over other policy
preferences at European level.
It is too early to gauge the impacts of enlargement on
all this. Many of the new MEPs seem strongly committed
to further European integration, but there are a number
of Eurosceptics among them as well. On economic
policies, the new members include both strong liberals
and others more nostalgic for the old certainties. On
foreign-policy issues such as attitudes to the Iraq
invasion, the policy differences have been well flagged-
up. It has also been predicted that enlargement may
bring about other shifts in parliamentary priorities with,
for example, greater interest being shown in cohesion
issues than, say environmental questions. One difference
which is already clear is that there are a higher percentage
of social conservatives among the new MEPs than
among those from the old Member States.
A final issue that is worth mentioning is the potential
impact of the embryonic European political parties, the
effects of enlargement upon them and the extent to
which they will contribute to provide clear and consistent
European policy choices for European citizens. These
parties include the Christian Democrats and other centre-
right parties in the European People’s Party (EPP),
socialists in the Party of European Socialists (PES),
liberals in the European Liberal, Democratic and Reform
Party (ELDR), the European Green Party that was
founded to succeed the European Federation of Green
Parties in February 2004 and the European Free Alliance
(EFA), which is made up of ‘representatives of stateless
nations’ and which constituted itself as a European
Political Party in March 2004. To differing degrees all
of these parties have been impacted by enlargement, and
have gained a considerable number of parties as full
members or observers.
The importance of these parties has been reinforced
by the recent adoption of Regulation 2004/2003 on the
regulations governing political parties at European level
and the rules regarding their funding, which became
operational after the 2004 European elections. In the
longer term this could help to strengthen their potential
role as mobilizers of European public opinion, and
contribute to the development of Europe-wide rather
than individual national policies. In the shorter term,
however, this is still far from being the case, not least
because the European political parties that have been
created do not correspond in most cases to the political
groups within the European Parliament. In some cases
their membership is different (for example the EPP-ED
includes not just the EPP parties but also the more ‘Euro-
hesitant’ parties in its ED wing, such as the British and
Czech Conservatives). The ALDE Group and the ELDR
Party also do not coincide. The Greens/EFA Group contains
parties from two separate European political parties.
Moreover several EP groups, such as the GUE, IND/DEM
and UEN Groups have no equivalent European political
parties, and indeed in some cases this would be contrary
to their core beliefs. For the moment, therefore, the political
groups within the European Parliament have the more
important role, but it will be interesting to see the extent
to which the European political parties succeed in
increasing their influence over the next few years.
3. Legitimacy
Impacts on turnout at the 2004 EP elections
The 2004 European elections had a disappointing overall
turnout of only 45.7%. The turnout rate was often low
in the old Member States, although it did increase in
certain countries, and in overall terms was only slightly
lower than in 1999. The most striking aspect, however,
was just how little interest there was in most new Member
States. Turnout was below the EU average except in
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Malta (82% – where there has been a high level of
interest, not only positive but also negative, and there
is a tradition of very strong participation in elections),
Cyprus (71% – where EU membership is a matter of top
national concern, and voting is obligatory) and, if only
just, in Lithuania (48%). Moreover in five of the ten,
turnout was below 30%, including Poland with 21% and
Slovakia with an all-time record anywhere of 17%.
Far from contributing to an increase in overall
electoral participation – as might have been expected,
given their apparent enthusiasm for EU membership –
the response of most the
new Member States thus
ensured continuation of
the trend by which average
turnout across the Commu-
nity/Union has fallen with
each successive elections.
Some commentators have
suggested that the falling
turnout rate in European
elections is open to mis-
interpretation, inasmuch as
there has been a more
general disenchantment
with politics in general.
Turnout, it is suggested, is
lower in all elections, not just in those to the European
Parliament. Yet turnout in the 2004 European elections
was lower than turnout in the latest national elections in
every single country of the 25 except Luxembourg. This
‘Euro Gap’ (i.e. the difference between the two turnout
rates) was a full 53% in Slovakia; over 40% in Sweden,
Austria and The Netherlands; and 30% or more in
Denmark, Hungary, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Latvia
and Slovenia.4
Given the growing importance of Parliament’s formal
role in the evolving European political system, this low
level of popular interest in the institution, especially in
the new Member States, is a matter for serious concern,
especially at a time when citizens are being invited to
ratify a new Constitution.
Concluding Remarks
The EP has grown greatly in power in recent years, and
now has a much stronger position than it used to have
within the inter-institutional triangle that it forms with
the Council and Commission. Its power of legislative
codecision has been extended, its budgetary powers are
very considerable and its powers of control and over EU
appointments have also been reinforced. It will now
have to demonstrate that it can make the best use of these
new powers by further improving its procedures within
the legislative process, by devoting more resources to
monitoring the implementation of EU law, and by
making a major contribution to the adoption of Europe’s
medium-term financial perspectives. In addition, the
EU draft Constitution, if eventually ratified, would
further consolidate the EP’s legislative and budgetary
powers, and the EP will have to show that it can live up
to these new responsibilities as well. The EP will also
have to face up to the great challenge that lies ahead in
better communicating the nature of its role and powers
to Europe’s citizens, so that it can seek to reverse the
trend to lower turnout by the time of the next European
Parliament elections in 2009, and thus help to reinforce
its future legitimacy.
A number of other related developments would help
to reinforce this process, including the potential con-
solidation of multi-level political parties, the establish-
ment of closer relations
between the European Par-
liament and the national
parliaments, and streng-
thening the connection
with European people. This
latter is vital as the Parlia-
ment is often not perceived
as being relevant to citi-
zens’ most pressing con-
cerns. Both the new Parlia-
ment and the new Commis-
sion have already indicated
that a high priority will be
attached to a continued
improvement of transpa-
rency and communications. This is certainly essential if
the institutions are to achieve, as they must, a degree of
public understanding and support which is more
commensurate with their existing powers and their
future role at the heart of a constitutionalized European
political system.
_________
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